August 12, 2014 § 3 Comments
Next the paradigm is linked to the unit of selection
…by the end of the talk Group selection (GS) or Multi level Selection (MLS) is used to explain both death as punishment for apostasy in Islam (Irtidād) and Elinor Ostrom’s findings on how common fisheries can be managed successfully.
And yes ….eusociality is not caused by haplo-diploidy but by shared defensible nests…
Before I forget the apostasy bit, lets see how best I can word the argument
“Groups that evolved to have rituals whereby apostates were killed (that had mindsets, fixed during their life span vis-à-vis this matter and which mindset can be argued to have been coded for by genes???) had more advantage, reproduced better and we are descended from them and hence share those sentiments (the urge to kill murtadds).”
I fail to see how the proponents of GS can maintain the possibility of such an outcome, since its appeal seems primarily based on the fact the it best explains why “virtue” will be selected for.
Haidt keeps using the term groupishness. If MLS is a better explanation for emergence of groupishness its not clear what all is subsumed under that term.
If there is ever a wish that lay people should be exposed to arguments among high profile academicians this whole correspondence following Steven Pinker’s essay contra-group selection on (Edge.org) surely answers it.
One of the simplest yet most incisive of responses was written by Nicolas Baumard of University of Pennsylvania.
He started by the following simple query:
Let’s grant that group selection is theoretically possible and let’s assume, at least for the sake of discussion, that it had an impact on human evolution; what would this really predict about human psychology?
Now individual selection does not exclude selection of moral behavior.
So the debate is not between a theory that predicts that humans are moral (group selection) and a theory that predicts they are not (individual selection), but between two theories of morality: one based on sacrifice for the group and the other one based on individual interests……. Is morality utilitarianist or contractualist?
To illustrate the inadequacy of utilitarianism a hypothetical case by moral philosopher Judith Thomson is put forward:
“A brilliant transplant surgeon has five patients, each in need of a different organ, each of whom will die without that organ. Unfortunately, there are no organs available to perform any of these five transplant operations. A healthy young traveler, just passing through the city the doctor works in, comes in for a routine checkup. In the course of doing the checkup, the doctor discovers that his organs are compatible with all five of his dying patients. Suppose further that if the young man were to disappear, no one would suspect the doctor.”
Let us bracket the question as to weather the response to such a question/situation is a discrete trait that can be selected for and if the same doctor will consistently (non randomly ) opt for the same solution. While ants and bees would agree to kill the young individual in the interest of the group, Baumard points out that, we humans, disagree.
Now in terms of our ideas of just punishment if again it were not just a spandrel what would we expect of GS? If punishment is a utilitarian trait, preferred sanctions should have evolved for their effectiveness as deterrents.
But taking a case like death penalty Baumard argues that:
Although many people claim that their opinion about death penalty is based on efficiency (partisans argue it deters crimes, opponents that it has no effect), several studies have shown that, many people would actually continue to support death penalty even if it had no deterrent value.
People support death penalty first and foremost because it seems to them that it is the only proportionate penalty for certain crimes (murder, rape, etc.), not because they see it as a useful tool to deter future crime.
If humans punish to restore fairness rather than to help the group, a preference or support for death as punishment for apostasy, is not something we’d expect.
But if we imagine societies who on average lack an immediate gut revulsion to this punishment, can any fruitful speculations be made about what sort of selective advantage such average instinctual preferences may lend them.